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ABSTRACT 
As e-government enters the “transformation” phase, public 
authorities face major challenges in terms of governance and 
leadership. The present article consolidates prior research related 
to organizational structure and governance, and provides an 
analytical framework intended to guide empirical enquiry and to 
orient action. We argue that our understanding is enhanced by 
distinguishing an “integration” stage and a “transcendence” stage 
of e-government maturity. While the former is accompanied by a 
profusion of inter-organizational arrangements, the latter’s 
distinctive feature are inter-personal networks. In order to ap-
praise the implications of these organizational structures, we 
identify the main reasons behind their growing importance, ana-
lyze the ways they create value, and lay the foundations of a nor-
mative approach for the choice of governance structures. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues;  
K.4.3 [Computers and Society]: Organizational Impacts;  
K.5.2 [Legal Aspects of Computing]: Governmental Issues; 
K.6.0 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
General – Economics. 
General Terms 
Management, Economics, Theory. 
Keywords 
E-government, Maturity Model, Business Models, Organizational 
Networks, Transaction Costs, Collective Action Problems, Gover-
nance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In our role as action researchers and experimental researchers in 
the context of e-government, we increasingly observe radical 
changes in the organizational landscape, as e-government fully 
enters the “transformation” stage. These changes are putting pub-
lic authorities before major challenges in terms of governance and 
leadership. Thus, the present article is part of a larger effort to 
come to grips with the issues arising in the context of an emerging 
new public order. Its primary focus is on consolidating existing 
knowledge related to organizational structure and governance, 
and on providing an analytical framework which can guide 
empirical enquiry and orient action. 
E-government maturity models [3, 26] vary in focus and with 
regard to the number of distinct stages, but they tend to show a 
similar pattern: Two initial stages which may be termed “web 
presence / interaction” and “transaction” are followed by a third 
stage generally referred to as “integration” or “transformation”. 
While the first two stages are primarily associated with a 
technology jump, leaving organizational structures largely un-
changed, the third stage involves a culture leap and deep 
organizational change [26]. Only a few models include stages 
occurring after “integration” / “transformation” [12, 3], which 
points to the fact that the characteristics of succeeding stages are 
still poorly understood. Key concepts mentioned with regard to 
these future stages are political participation, passive user 
participation (consisting in leveraging information on user-
behavior or user-preferences to improve services for users) as 
well as user empowerment. Developments in the private sector 
suggest additional concepts to be taken into account, such as user 
innovation and peer production [29, 35]. The bottom line of all 
these concepts is that inter-personal networks are tapped into to 
provide value with regard to production (or decision) processes. 
For the purpose of this paper we shall refer to this fourth stage of 
e-government as the “transcendence” stage. 
While the concept of integration points to the fact that previously 
unrelated or uncoordinated activities are being coordinated or 
merged, resulting in a transformation of public sector organi-
zations (in form of value-chain integration, separation of back and 
front office, service-oriented business architectures, etc. [3, 15]), 
the concept of transcendence refers to a further transformation 
process resulting in processes of value creation cutting not only 
through the boundaries of individual organizations, but also 
through the boundaries of the organizational sphere as such, by 
tapping into the value creating activities of inter-personal net-
works. These observations suggest that we need to focus our ana-
lysis on inter-organizational settings (epitomized for example by 
cross-agency or cross-sector collaborations) for the “integration”-
stage, and on inter-personal networks for the “transcendence”-
stage of e-government maturity (for an illustration see figure 1 in 
section 4). 
The present paper deals with the implications these transformation 
processes have for the organizational structure of the public sector 
and points to governance issues arising in the context of e-govern-
ment at the “integration” and at the “transcendence” stage. The 
goal is to sketch out an analytical framework and point to pre-
vious research and theoretical approaches, in order to provide the 
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basis for systematic descriptive analysis and to lay the theoretical 
foundations for a normative approach. The resulting framework 
may contribute to guiding further scientific enquiry and to helping 
practitioners in different positions within public sector organi-
zations or organizations partnering with the public sector to orient 
their actions. 
1.1 Structure of the paper 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short 
overview of the theoretical foundations of the analytical frame-
work; section 3 deals with the rationales behind inter-organi-
zational arrangements and goal-directed inter-personal networks; 
section 4 takes a closer look at how inter-organizational arrange-
ments and inter-personal networks create value; section 5 tackles 
the question of why the network mode of governance is presently 
gaining in importance; and the concluding section contains a short 
discussion of the relevance of the explanatory framework. 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The paper draws on insights from various fields of study; the con-
cepts most prominently referred to are derived from Contingency 
Theory, New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost Theory, 
the Business Model Approach, and General Systems Theory. 
2.1.1 Contingency Theory 
According to Contingency Theory [14] organizations need to 
adapt to their environment in order to ensure the performance 
necessary for their survival. Changes in the environment therefore 
call for changes in the organizational structure, which can 
generally be understood as an interplay between differentiation 
and integration: On one hand, organizations tend to differentiate 
themselves into functional divisions in order to adapt to their 
environment. On the other hand, organizations have to integrate 
their various parts in order to maintain the necessary unity of 
effort [4]. Postulating that both under-differentiation and over-
fragmentation of organizations would result in suboptimal 
performance, Contingency Theory provides a basis for analyzing 
the rationales behind inter-organizational arrangements. 
2.1.2 New Institutional Economics and Transaction 
Cost Theory 
New Institutional Economics analyzes the determinants of insti-
tutions by the tools of economic theory, focusing primarily on 
governance and the institutional environment. Transaction Cost 
Theory takes the transactions between economic actors as the 
basic units of analysis, considering governance as an effort to 
craft order to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains [39]. 
Concerning the development of e-government, we can argue that 
advances in the field of ICT give way not only to potential 
increases in efficiency with regard to transactions in existing 
settings, but also to opportunities to connect organizations and 
people in novel ways by making cross-boundary communication 
easier and cheaper. We would therefore expect that advances in 
the field of ICT accelerate the dynamics of organizational 
differentiation and integration and give way to new forms of 
cooperation. This is reflected in the “integration” and “trans-
cendent” stages of e-government maturity. 
Integration may take the form of hierarchical integration, of 
market integration – or, in the face of hierarchy failures and mar-
ket failures, the form of network integration [21]. As the increa-
sing momentum behind cross-agency partnerships and inter-juris-
dictional networks during the last two decades suggests, the net-
work mode of governance is on the rise [16, 20, 32]. The 
profusion of such inter-organizational arrangements may therefore 
be seen as one of the main corollaries of the “integration” stage of 
e-government.  
Additionally, the increasing importance of the network mode of 
governance is reflected by the growing role of user communities 
and peer group innovation in value creation [29, 35]. 
2.1.3 Business Model Approach 
There is no universal definition of the “business model” concept 
(see [18] for a synopsis of various definitions). Generally spea-
king, a “business model” helps conceptualizing and understanding 
how an organization or an organizational network creates value. 
As such, it can serve as a tool for analysis, support the creation of 
shared vision, and facilitate the diffusion of organizational inno-
vation [cf. 18]. The Business Model Approach conceives of orga-
nizations or organizational networks as systems of value-creation 
and value-distribution. According to Timmers [31], business mo-
dels provide information on product, service and information 
flows, they describe the various business actors and their roles as 
well as their potential benefits, and they identify the sources of 
revenues associated with the particular business model. Thus, a 
business model focuses on describing the elements and relation-
ships that outline how an organization creates, disseminates and 
appropriates value. For the purpose of the present paper we focus 
on three aspects or “building blocks” of business models: the 
creation of value, the mobilization of resources, and governance 
structures. We thereby focus not only on organizations, but also 
on inter-organizational arrangements as well as inter-personal net-
works as loci of value creation. 
2.1.4 General Systems Theory 
General Systems Theory describes various types of systems (inor-
ganic, organic, organizational) using a uniform language with the 
objective of identifying fundamental principles applying to all 
systems. A system can generally be defined as “a set of inter-
acting units or elements that form an integrated whole intended to 
perform some function” or, put differently, as “any structure that 
exhibits order, pattern and purpose”, which in turn implies some 
constancy over time [27 (p. 17)]. In our attempt to better 
understand organizational and governance issues at the “inte-
gration” and the “transcendence” stage of e-government maturity, 
we conceive organizations, inter-organizational arrangements and 
inter-personal networks as (parts of) systems of value creation and 
dissemination. We thereby build our analytical framework around 
some of the core principles identified by systems theory. 
3. DRIVERS BEHIND “INTEGRATION” 
AND “TRANSCENDENCE” 
There are different rationales behind inter-organizational arrange-
ments and goal-directed inter-personal networks. In this section 
we draw on existing literature on cross-agency collaboration, 
organizational networks, organizational partnerships, peer-pro-
duction and open communities in order to provide an overview. 
We conclude the section by a short discussion of the particula-
rities of the public sector.  
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3.1 Rationales Behind Inter-Organizational 
Arrangements 
Rationales behind inter-organizational arrangements identified in 
the literature [e.g., 7, 17, 37, 33] can be assigned to three broad 
categories: effectiveness considerations, efficiency considera-
tions, and considerations of legitimacy with regard to regulation 
and/or funding rules.  
In accordance with Contingency Theory we can assume that 
organizations need to adapt to their environment in order to 
ensure the performance necessary for their survival and that this 
adaptation takes the form of an interplay between integration and 
differentiation. A cursory analysis of existing inter-organizational 
e-government projects leads to the following conclusions: In some 
projects coordination among organizations occurs because the 
social, economic and political problems do not stay within the 
boundaries of jurisdictions and administrative units. Increasing 
differentiation of organizations (e.g. in the health sector), com-
bined with the increasing importance of so called “wicked issues”, 
which cannot be solved by an organization acting alone, entails a 
growing need for inter-organizational integration [cf. 4, 16]. IT 
can be employed to support these collaborations, but the basic 
rationale behind them can be described as policy driven. In other 
projects, the pooling of resources occurs in order to make better 
use of IT, allowing for the provision of new types of services or 
resulting in a decrease of transaction costs. These projects can be 
seen as technology-driven. Thus, inter-organizational integration 
takes place in a context characterized by imminent failure and 
promising new opportunities [cf. 7]. 
3.2 Rationales Behind Goal-Directed Inter-
personal Networks 
Rationales behind goal-directed inter-personal networks can be 
analyzed in similar terms as those behind inter-organizational 
arrangements: In some cases, the prospect of imminent failure 
moves companies towards experimenting with tapping into 
collaborative communities. This is illustrated, for example, by the 
Goldcorp case, where an online community was set up to prospect 
for gold [29 (p. 8)], or by the embracement of an open source 
approach by major companies, such as Netscape or Sun, facing 
the dominant position of Microsoft on the software market. A 
public sector example where imminent failure has given way to a 
collaborative approach is the Peer-to-Patent project, which endea-
vors to improve patent quality in sectors plagued with a high 
number of possibly unmeritorious patents and high litigation 
costs, such as software or business methods [40].  
Collaborative communities have also provided a viable solution to 
prevent the danger of mutual blockage occurring due to 
overlapping property rights in research areas characterized by a 
high degree of sequential and complementary innovation (e.g., the 
Human Genome Project [28]).  
In other cases, new ventures and collaboration projects, such as 
InnoCentive, an “open innovation” company, or Wikipedia, are 
driven by the prospect of promising new opportunities for doing 
business or creating public value. New ways of creating public 
value are also employed with regard to the public sector, often at 
the instigation of civil society organizations. Examples include 
“WhatDoTheyKnow?” – a British portal for Freedom of Informa-
tion requests – or “FixMyStreet” – a British website which helps 
people report problems they have found to their local council by 
locating them on a map. 
3.3 Particularities of the Public Sector 
As to the prospect of imminent failure and the readiness to exploit 
new promising opportunities, the public sector differs from the 
private sector in two crucial points: First, there is little competi-
tive pressure, which makes failure in the sense of going out of 
business an unlikely event. Second, there are hardly any new 
entrants challenging the incumbents by doing business in 
radically new ways. This could lead us to expect public 
administration to be rather reluctant to engage in inter-
organizational collaboration or to tap into inter-personal 
networks. There are however a series of aspects which mitigate 
this picture: First, public administration has a long tradition of 
dealing with “wicked issues” and collaborating across 
organizational boundaries [cf. 30]. Second, budget constraints, the 
increased focus on efficiency, and the opening up of some areas 
of the public sector to competition in the wake of NPM-reform 
have put some pressure on public administrations. And third, new 
ways of harnessing the value creating power of user communities 
in the context of the public sector have successfully been 
proposed by civil society organizations (see for example various 
e-participation projects, such as offerings enhancing transparency 
or services allowing users to ask elected officials questions [2]). 
Radically new ways of doing things in the public sector may 
indeed emerge from civil society. 
As Lenk notes, e-government constitutes a countercurrent to 
NPM-reform, by shifting attention away from the single admini-
strative unit to administrative value chains, which often span 
across organizational boundaries [15]. This is particularly true for 
the “integration” stage of e-government maturity, whereas the 
“transcendence” stage takes us even one step further by 
transcending administrative boundaries altogether. We could 
however argue that one of the core precepts of NPM-reform 
remains untouched: that manageability needs to be restored by re-
establishing unity of tasks, resources and competency. This time, 
however, market ideology and the preoccupation with a stronger 
vertical line has been replaced by network thinking and a focus on 
collaboration. 
4. THE LOGICS OF VALUE CREATION 
4.1 Adopting a Systemic View 
From a systemic perspective, any e-government activity can be 
conceived as a part of a system of value creation and dissemi-
nation on behalf of end-users or some other beneficiaries. Further 
stakeholders in value creation are contributors (of financial or 
other resources), who may or may not be identical with the bene-
ficiaries. In accordance with General Systems Theory we can 
expect a certain number of principles to hold true with regard to 
such systems of value creation (cf. [27]): 
First, systems fulfill a function by transforming input into output. 
In the case of the systems of value creation in question, the 
function consists in creating and disseminating value by transfor-
ming or employing various forms of resources (financial resour-
ces, knowledge and information, etc.). The distinction between 
resources and value is a purely analytical one: what appears to be 
the value stream (output) from the point of view of one system 
may be considered a flow of resources (input) from the point of 
view of another one. 
Second, the functioning of systems cannot be understood solely 
on the basis of an analysis of their parts, nor can the parts be 
understood by the sole analysis of the system. With regard to the 
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Figure 1. Interorganizational arrangements and  
interpersonal networks. 
creation and dissemination of value this implies that both the 
system itself and its parts have to be considered as loci of value 
creation. We therefore have to assume that both the system as a 
whole as well as its parts have their own logics of value creation. 
Third, systems are complex wholes made up of smaller sub-
systems. We can therefore dissect the systems under analysis into 
their components if this enhances our understanding. 
Fourth, systems persist only as long as they import energy from 
their environment. We can therefore assume that the systems of 
value creation under analysis tend to disintegrate if they cease to 
mobilize resources from their environment.  
4.2 Different Faces of Value 
In order for the different components of a system of value 
creation to remain integrated, each of them needs to be able to 
appropriate a share of the value added. The concept of “value” 
has however different meanings and interpretations (see [9] for an 
overview). Alongside the distinction between “use value” and 
“exchange value”, present in classical economic thought, new 
concepts such as “public value” or “common good” have made 
their appearance. Authors following the Business Model 
Approach usually consider the realization of exchange value in 
form of profits as the purpose of a company’s activities. This 
focus on exchange value is however of limited use in the context 
of public sector activities. We therefore have to elaborate on the 
notion of value, which is at the heart of our analytical framework. 
Some clarification is achieved by distinguishing “use value” and 
“exchange value”. Use value refers to the specific qualities of a 
product (i.e. the output of a system of value creation) perceived 
by end-users or other beneficiaries in relation to their needs. 
Assessment of use value is subjective; it pertains to the individual 
consumer. Exchange value, in contrast, is the monetary amount 
realized at a single point in time when the exchange of the 
product takes place. As such it is determined by the bargaining 
relationships between buyers and sellers. With regard to public 
sector organizations reference is often made to yet another type of 
value: “public value”. Unlike for the aforementioned types of 
value, there is no generally accepted definition of “public value”. 
We can however point to some of its characteristics: Public value 
takes into account externalities as well as the aspect of 
sustainability. Furthermore, it does not pertain to an individual 
consumer, but to a collective. This is illustrated by the concept of 
merit goods, introduced by Musgrave, which implies the 
provision of goods in the name of the public interest, regardless of 
individual preferences.  
In analyzing e-government activities as parts of systems of value 
creation we have to account for the different faces of value: Sys-
tems of value creation may indeed produce different forms of va-
lue, and economic actors involved in the systems may vary in 
their value orientation (the distinction of different faces of value 
is particularly relevant in analyzing public-private partnerships or 
participants’ motivations in user communities).  
4.3 Subsystems of Value Creation 
The adoption of a systemic view as described above suggests that 
we can dissect the systems of value creation under analysis into 
several subsystems. The delimitation of the system and its sub-
systems is a purely analytical one, containing no ontological 
statement [27]. For the purpose of analysis, we suggest two 
approaches to delimiting subsystems of value creation: First, we 
conceive of inter-organizational arrangements and inter-personal 
networks as subsystems within larger systems of value creation in 
the public sector. Second, we consider e-government development 
and its distinct stages as subsystems of value creation. The first 
approach puts e-government in a wider context of public sector 
activity, whereas the second approach focuses on the development 
of IT-solutions for the public sector. 
4.3.1 Inter-organizational Arrangements and Inter-
personal Networks 
An inter-organizational arrangement (inter-personal network) can 
be defined as a set of organizations (individuals) the interactions 
of which are goal-directed and predominantly coordinated by a 
network mode of governance. According to this definition, inter-
organizational arrangements and inter-personal networks can be 
distinguished from their environment by the mode of governance 
by which interactions are coordinated (see figure 1). This allows 
us to distinguish inter-organizational arrangements from other 
forms of integration that are preponderantly hierarchical or 
market-based (see [4] for a discussion of different forms of inte-
gration).   
If we analyze inter-organizational arrangements and inter-perso-
nal networks from the systemic perspective outlined above, both 
the relationships with their environment as well as the relation-
ships among their components can be understood as resource 
flows and value streams. Any analysis of interactions within inter-
organizational arrangements or engaging such arrangements with 
their environment therefore needs to focus first of all on the logics 
of the underlying flows of resources and values; for if they cease, 
the (sub)system as such will eventually disintegrate.  
4.3.2 Value-Chain of E-government Development 
Based on Agranoff’s typology of “public management networks” 
[1], we can identify four subsystems of value creation in the con-
text of e-government development, which constitute a value chain 
(see figure 2): 
Informational subsystems serve the exchange of information and 
know how. Participants in informational subsystems decide indi-
vidually whether they will take up any changes or actions 
(symposia serving the diffusion of information on present trends 
in e-government among the IT- and the government community 
fall in this category).  
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Developmental subsystems serve the provision of training, re-
search and other services which increase the participants’ capacity 
to implement solutions individually (cf. e-government research 
communities). 
Outreach subsystems serve the elaboration of strategies for 
change, leading to an exchange or coordination of resources, 
although decision making and implementation are ultimately left 
to the individual participants of the subsystem. The exchange and 
coordination of resources may involve the common development 
of artifacts which in turn are implemented by each participant  
individually (interoperability between the partners’ systems being 
no requirement; e.g. common development of prototypes for new 
e-government applications). 
Action subsystems serve as platforms to make inter-organizatio-
nal or inter-personal adjustments, formally adopt collaborative 
courses of action, and deliver services or ensure production in a 
coordinated fashion. This may involve the common or parallel 
implementation and use of standards or artifacts (interoperability 
between the partners’ systems being a requirement; e.g. shared 
processes, shared services, the use of common standards, etc.). 
Action subsystems are at the end of the e-government value chain. 
This implies that any value creating activity within the context of 
e-government has to be assessed with regard to its ultimate impact 
at the level of action subsystems, typically reaching beyond the 
sphere of e-government. 
 
 
Figure 2. Value chain of e-government development. 
 
The distinction of different subsystems in the e-government value 
chain reflects two insights: First, within every inter-organizational 
arrangement there are many different types of relationships that 
bind it together [22]; some form “goal-directed” networks and 
others “serendipitous” networks, such as networks of trust, reputa-
tion, etc. (in the present paper we focus exclusively on the first 
kind, although there is no doubt that the second kind has a major 
impact on the success of an inter-organizational arrangement or a 
purposive inter-personal network). Second, networks are struc-
tured differently, depending on the resources involved. Thus, Pro-
van and Huang found that in a given inter-organizational arrange-
ment, networks serving the sharing of non-tangible resources 
(such as knowledge) were less centralized than networks where 
relationships were based on control of material resources [22]. 
Similarly, Lowndes and Skelcher report in their study of urban 
regeneration partnerships, that the partnerships relied predomi-
nantly on a network mode of governance in the preparation stage 
(knowledge and development subsystems), on a hierarchical mode 
of governance during “creation and consolidation” (outreach), on 
a market mode of governance for “program delivery” (action) and 
again on a network mode of governance at partnership “termina-
tion or succession”. In addition it was found that the network 
mode of governance had continuing importance in ensuring 
collaborative success throughout the entire life-cycle of the 
partnerships [16]. In a similar vein, Bouwman and MacInnes ob-
serve, on the basis of a case study examining the way a company 
adjusted its business model, that “[b]usiness models change as 
collaborating firms move from research to roll-out and maturity as 
a result of influence from forces such as technology, regulation, 
and markets. Firms will seek out new partners as they move from 
stage to stage” [6 (p. 9)]. 
4.4 Models of Value Creation and Resource 
Mobilization 
Business models are a means to conceptualize how an organiza-
tion or an organizational network creates value. They usually con-
tain descriptions of the businesses value proposition, of its sources 
of revenue, of the various business actors and their roles, as well 
as of the expected benefits of the various stakeholders. In the fol-
lowing, we will adopt a business model approach in order to reach 
a better understanding of how inter-organizational arrangements 
and inter-personal networks create value, and of how organiza-
tions create value in the context of such arrangements and net-
works (similarly, we could treat the question of how different 
participants in inter-personal networks create use-value for them-
selves). It is important to adopt both view-points – the inter-
organizational arrangement / the inter-personal network taken as a 
whole, and the participant organizations taken individually – 
given the fact that “in the network context the balancing of value 
propositions and revenue streams between partners is a crucial 
task in order to achieve an incentive compatible solution for the 
participating players” [24 (p. 15)]. 
4.4.1 Models of Value Creation 
Research on business models in the e-government context is still 
scarce, the work of Janssen et al. [13] being a notable exception. 
Drawing on previous work in the context of e-commerce, the 
authors identify a number of atomic Web-based business models 
for e-government, which can be used as analytical building blocks 
to describe the logics of value creation in e-government. Building 
on their work, we can suggest a number of atomic models of 
value creation for inter-organizational arrangements and inter-
personal networks respectively (table 1).  
At the level of individual organizations, corresponding atomic 
models of value creation would point to roles or functions within 
the network, such as “infrastructure service provider”, “value-net 
integrator”, “content provider”, “front office operator”, “commu-
nity broker”, “collaboration platform provider”, etc. They exist 
along with other atomic models of value creation present within 
an organization. 
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Table 1. Atomic models of value creation in inter-
organizational arrangements and in inter-personal networks. 
Value-net integration 
The collection, processing, and distribution of information and 
data from several organizations within a value-net or along a 
value-chain are coordinated; several organizations collaborate 
in a network to provide products or services to a certain 
customer segment.  
Single point of contact 
Provision of an organization wide single point of contact, 
consolidating all services provided by a large multiunit 
organization; front office activities of the various units of one 
large organization are centralized.  
Full service provision 
Provision of a one-stop shop, bundling information and servi-
ces from a number of organizations for a specific target group; 
front office activities of several organizations are centralized. 
Service-oriented architecture 
Many organizations with similar needs in terms of functionality 
use the same infrastructure services provided by a single orga-
nization; a (semi-)autonomous organization concentrates and 
provides services to participant organizations acting as users. 
Collaboration 
People with a common interest or common objectives colla-
borate to create value. 
Virtual community 
A community of recurring customers or users (e.g., customers 
and sellers on a community-enhanced online-marketplace) in-
teract and thereby generate content valuable to others. 
 
 
Table 2. Atomic models of revenue  
generation and/or resource mobilization. 
Advertising 
Advertising space is sold on premises or websites. 
User fees / license fees / public monopoly rents 
Money is levied from users or beneficiaries of specific goods 
or services or from holders of a public license (various pro-
fessions and trades, pollution, software, etc.).  
Sales 
Goods or services are commercialized.  
Private sponsorship / public funding  
Financing is received from third parties under particular 
conditions, within a given legal framework, for a particular 
purpose, from the public budget, etc. 
Club / closed community: membership fees / member con-
tributions (member benefits)  
The club receives financing or contributions from club mem-
bers. (Club members receive benefits from the club.) 
Open community: contributions (benefits)  
The open community receives contributions from participants, 
such as contributions to open source software, etc. (Participants 
profit from the contributions of others). 
Donations 
Financing or contributions are received from third parties 
without return considerations. 
Taxes / fines  
Money is levied in form of income tax, consumption tax, 
targeted tax or fines and attributed in a political process. 
 
4.4.2 Models of Resource Mobilization 
In a similar vein, we can build on Griggs and Wild’s work on 
revenue sources of public administration [11] in order to propose 
a set of atomic models of revenue generation and/or resource 
mobilization (table 2). Most of them may be applied both at the 
network level and at the level of individual organizations. Some 
limitations apply: Taxes and fines (and partly fees) generally 
contribute to a common budget of a political entity; only 
organizations being part of the political entity can receive money 
directly from the budget. In clubs and open communities, resource 
flows may occur in both directions: from the members to the 
club/community or vice versa (the member perspective is 
indicated in brackets). The atomic models give an idea of how 
organizations and networks mobilize resources. 
The “club” model corresponds to inter-organizational arrange-
ments (contributions taking either the form of membership fees, in 
kind contributions, or work directed at common activities), where-
as the “open community” model requires the existence of an inter-
personal network. The creation of inter-organizational arrange-
ments may also be motivated by prospects for external funding. 
5. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
New Institutional Economics conceives of governance as “the 
means by which to infuse order in a relation where potential 
conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual 
gains” [38 (p. 1090)]. Thus, the term “governance structures” 
refers to the rules, roles and behavioral patterns which configure 
the way collective action occurs.  
Governance structures in inter-organizational arrangements have 
been analyzed from various angles: focusing on the prevailing 
modes of governance, on internal administrative structures and 
their development paths, on the impact regulation and funding 
policies have on the functioning of collaborative arrangements, 
etc. [e.g., 16, 23]. Similar research exists in the field of open 
communities. These analyses can serve as a basis for the develop-
ment of governance models for inter-organizational arrangements 
and inter-personal networks. This is however beyond the scope of 
this paper. In the remainder of this section we will therefore limit 
ourselves to sketching out what we suggest to be a valid 
foundation for a normative approach in dealing with issues of 
governance. The adoption of a normative approach (as opposed to 
a purely descriptive and explanatory one) is necessary if the theo-
retical framework sketched out in this paper is to be used to guide 
action or to evaluate existing governance structures. 
5.1 Effectiveness of Governance Structures 
The abovementioned definition of governance implies that the 
effectiveness of governance structures needs to be assessed in 
terms of their contribution to solving collective action problems. 
Within the framework of our systemic model of value creation, 
collective action problems can be understood as organizational 
problems relating to the creation of value as well as to its 
appropriation, distribution or dissemination. The collective action 
problems identified in political science and institutional 
economics can roughly be attributed to four main types: “free 
riding/opportunism”, “blockage”, “congestion”, and “depletion” 
(see table 3). 
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Table 3. Typology of collective action problems. 
Type Definition Example(s) 
Free Riding / 
Opportunism 
Someone takes profit from the value producing activity of 
others without due retribution or accepts retribution for a 
value producing activity without duly accomplishing it. 
Scientific plagiarism;   
opportunistic behavior in a principal-agent setting.  
Blockage Someone having control over a resource prevents others 
from employing it in value creating activities, and/or 
different resources cannot be put to use in combination 
because of a lack of interoperability. 
The use of patents to block certain technological develop-
ments; 
Interoperability/compatibility problems. 
 
Congestion Excessive usage diminishes the overall utility of a resource 
at a given moment in time. 
 
Air pollution (if negative externalities outweigh the benefits 
obtained thanks to the polluting activity);  
traffic jams, network overload, etc. 
Depletion Usage intensity or the type of usage is such that the essence 
of a resource is diminished or destroyed. 
Over-exploitation of renewable natural resources (e.g., 
overfishing, overgrazing);  
Exploitation and irreversible transformation of a non-re-
newable natural resource (e.g., the burning of petrol). 
 
Figure 3. Re-use and combined use of architecture elements. 
From an economic point of view, collective action problems tend 
to lead to underproduction or to excessive consumption of a good 
or a resource, putting at stake overall utility. Collective action 
problems vary in function of their context. One of the major in-
fluence factors are the characteristics of the goods or services 
concerned. Thus, economic theory distinguishes between various 
types of goods which are characterized by particular collective 
action problems. The classical typology is based on two criteria: 
rivalry in consumption and excludability of consumers. Original-
ly, its focus was on the distinction of goods which can be provi-
ded in a market system and goods the production of which calls 
for state intervention, opposing “private goods” and “(inclusive) 
public goods” [19]. Further contributions to the theory have led to 
a deeper analysis of intermediary types of goods and to the 
identification of additional differentiation criteria, resulting in the 
description of new types. Common to all these approaches is the 
assumption that different types of goods are characterized by 
different collective action problems, which require different 
governance structures to regulate production and consumption. 
The inherent characteristics of goods are mediated by exogenous 
factors, such as social practices regulating their use, property 
regimes defining who has legitimate control over them, or the 
ways in which a good or a resource can be combined with other 
goods or resources to create value (depending on the state of 
technology) [10, 19]. All these factors have an influence on the 
effectiveness of governance structures in a given setting. In the 
following, we will discuss the characteristics of goods generic to 
e-government (referring to the value chain of e-government 
development). The focus will be on the identification of collective 
action problems, laying the basis for the analysis of two particular 
types of governance structures, characteristic for the “integration” 
and the “transcendence” stage of e-government maturity: clubs 
and open communities. 
5.2 Characteristics of Goods Generic to 
E-government 
From a technical point of view, we can generally distinguish be-
tween four architectural layers in e-government settings: pro-
cesses, data, applications and system infrastructure. The “integra-
tion” and the “transcendence” stage of e-government maturity are 
characterized by the fact that elements of these layers are 
developed and/or deployed in an increasingly coordinated fashion 
across and beyond organizational boundaries. Depending on 
where they are located within the value-chain of e-government 
development (cf. section 3.3.1), inter-organizational arrangements 
and inter-personal networks may focus on the  generation and the 
exchange of knowhow, or they may concentrate either on the re-
use of architecture elements, on their combined use, or on both 
(see figure 3). 
 
Two types of goods described in the literature seem particularly 
useful for analyzing the goods present in e-government settings: 
infrastructure resources [cf. 10] and information goods [cf. 34]: 
5.2.1 Infrastructure Resources 
Infrastructure resources may be consumed non-rivalrously and 
serve as inputs into a wide range of productive processes. Social 
demand for the resources is driven primarily by downstream 
productive activity. Often, the outputs from these processes are 
public and nonmarket goods that generate positive externalities. 
Traditional infrastructure resources comprise transportation, com-
munication, governance systems, education, energy supply, and 
water supply. A wide range of other resources, not traditionally 
considered infrastructure resources, have similar characteristics: 
natural resources, information resources, the Internet, etc. 
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Infrastructure resources are associated with a set of economic 
problems: Costly exclusion and large economies of scale (natural 
monopolies) result in under-provision when provision is left to the 
market, and large positive consumption externalities make it 
difficult to measure overall utility. Infrastructure resources often 
exhibit network effects (utility increases with the number of 
users) and economies of scope. Some of them exhibit problems of 
congestion (e.g., computer hardware) and depletion (natural 
resources). Infrastructures taking the form of networks display 
blockage problems with regard to connection and recombination 
(interoperability problems) and bottlenecks (resulting from a 
particular network structure). 
5.2.2 Information Goods 
Information goods are goods which can be represented in digital 
form. Their economic characteristics vary according to the func-
tion they take in the context of an act of communication: In their 
function as code or as transmission media, information goods dis-
play the general characteristics of infrastructure resources – 
examples comprise programming languages, document formats, 
or software used for information exchange. They are non-rival in 
consumption (although the hardware on which software runs may 
exhibit congestion problems), and they exhibit interoperability 
problems (due to the existence of legacy systems, or because of 
strategic behavior). Information goods in their function of mes-
sage/content (e.g. the text of a book) are often non-rival (with the 
exception of strategically relevant information) and display the 
characteristics of experience goods, which means that they need 
to be (at least partly) consumed before their value can be 
appreciated, which raises the opportunism problem. In addition, 
they are often cumulative, i.e. they are characterized by sequential 
and incremental innovation. In this case they display the 
characteristics of an infrastructure resource. In contrast, 
information goods in their function as unique identifiers (e.g., the 
name of a person, an ISBN number) are rival in use.  
5.2.3 Collective Action Problems in E-government 
Settings 
Based on this overview, the collective action problems present in 
different e-government contexts (knowledge sharing, re-use, or 
combined use of architecture elements) can be described as 
follows: 
Exchange of knowhow is associated with medium network 
externalities, given relatively high transaction costs of knowledge 
sharing. The main collective action problems are non-disclosure 
for strategic reasons (which can be assimilated to free-riding/op-
portunism or blockage, depending on the circumstances) and the 
free-rider problem. Network externalities increase if a common 
standard for documentation is agreed upon, reducing transaction 
costs of knowledge and information sharing. Uniform documen-
tation standards display however compatibility problems (block-
age due to strategic behavior or existing legacy standards). 
Combined use of architecture elements can generally be said to be 
associated with large network externalities; exceptions however 
apply concerning shared data (due to data protection issues), 
shared hardware infrastructure (prone to congestion), and adjusted 
processes (as long as process adjustment is more of a one-to-one 
issue between two distinct partners than a question of widely used 
process standards). The main collective action problems associ-
ated with “combined use” are incompatibilities (blockage due to 
legacy systems and/or strategic issues). Agreement on common 
standards and, in the case of the combined use of data, agreement 
on unique identifiers is required. 
Re-use of architecture elements can be expected to be associated 
with medium network externalities, given the transaction costs of 
knowledge sharing. Their amount varies however in function of 
the compatibility between systems. The main collective action 
problems of “re-use” are non-disclosure for strategic reasons 
(trade secrets – which can be assimilated to free-riding or block-
age, depending on the circumstances), for reasons related to high 
transaction costs (blockage problem due to incompatibilities), or 
due to the free rider problem. The problem of non-disclosure can 
be eschewed when processes, applications and system infrastruc-
ture are provided in a “black box”-manner. In this case, problems 
due to lock-in may arise (risk of opportunistic behavior on behalf 
of the provider, or blockage, e.g. when support is discontinued).  
5.3 Different Modes of Governance 
According to institutional economic theory, there are three modes 
of governance accounting for the social coordination between 
organizations: the market mode, the hierarchical mode and the 
network mode of governance. The market mode of governance is 
characterized by contractual relationships over property rights 
mediated by a price mechanism. Markets are efficient if demand 
and supply are constituted by a (potentially) large number of enti-
ties, if property rights are well defined and enforceable, and if 
information is (nearly) perfect. If one of these conditions is not 
satisfied, market inefficiencies occur. The hierarchical mode of 
governance in turn is characterized by a hierarchical structure 
based on employment relationships and administrative fiat. 
Hierarchies are efficient if interactions are largely routine-like 
(based on stable roles and rules), if control, supervision and 
feedback are facilitated by relatively small organizational size and 
if organizational complexity is relatively low [37]. The network 
mode of governance is characterized by informal relationships, 
based on interdependencies and complementary interests, which 
are sustained by trust, loyalty and reciprocity [16]. Networks are 
efficient if opportunist behavior by the partners of a network can 
be precluded thanks to reputational concerns. This usually implies 
that network composition and membership have to be relatively 
stable.  
The three modes of governance are ideal types and therefore rare-
ly to be found in their pure form [16]. In reality, we may rather 
find that a particular organizational arrangement is associated 
with different modes of governance. In addition to the three 
classical modes of governance, a fourth generic governance 
structure has been suggested: “bazaar governance” [8], alterna-
tively termed “peer production” [5] or “community governance” 
[36].  
In the following we will point out why, from the perspective of 
New Institutional Economics and Transaction Cost Theory, inter-
organizational arrangements and inter-personal networks as forms 
of non-market and non-hierarchical modes of governance are 
gaining in importance in the e-government context, and conclude 
this section with a short description of two ideal types of 
governance structures, corresponding to the “integration” and the 
“transformation” stage of e-government maturity. 
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5.3.1 Reasons for the Growing Importance of Non-
market and Non-hierarchical Modes of Governance in 
the E-government Context 
Decreasing transaction costs for information exchange have led to 
increasing economies of scale and network externalities in the 
field of information goods. Different market failures occur in this 
context: imperfect competition due to natural monopolies, under-
provision due to large positive consumption externalities, as well 
as other problems associated with information goods due to their 
character as experience goods. A private property regime may un-
der some circumstances encourage the production of information 
goods, but as consumption is largely non-rival, it has only limited 
benefits or even disadvantages on the consumption side. Hierar-
chy failures, on the other hand, occur due to large organizational 
size and high organizational complexity. Furthermore, it has been 
noted that markets and hierarchies are inferior to communities in 
identifying and allocating creativity [36]. In the face of important 
market and hierarchical failures, other governance structures have 
proven more effective, such as clubs (in the form of partnerships, 
organizational networks, consortia, etc., but also in the form of 
closed communities) and open communities. As we enter the 
“transcendence” stage of e-government, we will more frequently 
witness how closed inter-personal networks, which often ensure 
the good functioning of inter-organizational networks (see for 
example [4] for a discussion of the critical role of communities of 
practice for the functioning of inter-organizational networks in the 
health sector), are opened up to form open communities. On the 
other hand, we can expect to observe more examples of inter-
personal networks organized as clubs or open communities taking 
on parapublic functions with regard to information collection, 
information processing, transparency, etc.  
5.3.2 Clubs 
 “A club is a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sha-
ring one or more of the following: production costs, the members’ 
characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits” 
[25 (p. 335)]. Clubs are efficient forms of governance when col-
lective production and/or consumption lead to congestion or 
crowding. Exclusion mechanisms ensure optimal club size, opti-
mal homogeneity and prevent free-riding (exclusion entails how-
ever organizational and administrative costs). In the context of 
e-government, these characteristics are of particular interest in the 
face of congestion problems (sharing of hardware) and free-rider 
problems as well as in situations, where a certain degree of homo-
geneity is of advantage (e.g., the elaboration of common 
standards for knowledge, information and data exchange), or in 
cases where the need for a certain degree of hierarchical control 
and oversight and/or data protection issues prevent a full opening 
up of an inter-personal network. 
5.3.3 Open Communities 
“A community is an organizational form for economic value crea-
tion that is characterized by voluntary membership, high auto-
nomy and whose members receive little or no extrinsic rewards” 
[36 (p. 126)]. Value created by open communities is to a large 
extent subject to a collective property regime (e.g., open source 
licenses) or has the characteristics of a public good. Open 
communities transcend existing organizations. Furthermore, 
contributors exercise control over the production process [8]. 
Compared to other governance structures, open communities have 
a number of advantages: First, they are associated with important 
economies in terms of transaction and production costs (no exclu-
sion costs, no contracting costs, basically no direct monetary 
rewards for contributions). Second, they show important network 
effects – especially where future contributions remain under a free 
access regime (cf. copyleft licenses). Third, they alleviate the free 
rider problem thanks to a large number of potential contributors, 
large economies of scale, and network effects. And fourth, the 
open access regime allows for maximum overall utility in the face 
of consumption externalities. Drawbacks of open communities 
include high transaction uncertainty (no enforcement mechanisms 
for contributions), the difficulty to impose quality standards on 
contributions, and a high rate of project failure [8]. These 
drawbacks are however alleviated by a parallelization of tasks and 
projects, resulting in a high degree of redundancy [36]. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
The present paper has identified inter-organizational arrange-
ments and inter-personal networks as the two distinctive organi-
zational forms of the “integration” and the “transcendence” stage 
of e-government maturity. The main drivers behind them are the 
quest for effectiveness in the face of complexity, as well as the 
prospect of leveraging the efficiency-enhancing potential of 
information technology. Inter-organizational arrangements and 
inter-personal networks add value to public sector activities by 
integrating the work of multiple organizations and by tapping into 
the value creating power of open communities. A look at the 
economic characteristics of the resources involved in the e-
government value chain reveals great potential for inter-
organizational collaboration and open communities. Careful 
analysis of the collective action problems occurring in a given 
context is however needed in order to choose the most effective 
governance structures. 
In order to facilitate this analysis we have provided a framework 
which can serve as a basis for strategic decision making by practi-
tioners in the context of the public sector – such as public and 
private sector executives or program and project leaders eager to 
harness the value creating power of inter-organizational collabo-
rations and open communities. The analytical framework under-
scores the importance of getting a differentiated picture of value 
creation and resource mobilization: it provides a multiple net-
works perspective and a two-sided view, considering both indivi-
dual organizations and inter-organizational arrangements (inter-
personal networks) as loci of value creation. In addition, it sets the 
foundations for an evaluative approach to governance structures, 
assessing their purposefulness with regard to their contribution to 
solving collective action problems and taking into account the 
intrinsic and exogenous characteristics of the goods and services 
involved. 
Besides its practical use, the framework will guide further re-
search, including a study of the implementation of the Swiss e-
government strategy which draws heavily on inter-organizational 
collaboration in order to implement its forty-two prioritized pro-
jects. Particular attention will be paid to the role of clubs and 
open communities in the development, implementation and ex-
ploitation of e-government solutions as well as to the dynamics 
involved when public authorities increasingly move from coordi-
nation mechanisms characterized by hierarchical oversight and 
control to forms of co-leadership within inter-organizational ar-
rangements and/or open communities. In addition, the present 
paper provides valuable insights in the field of e-participation. 
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